vole
Clone
Read only, no credentials:
https://rodent.software/git/vole.git
Write over SSH with a registered key:
git clone ssh://git@0.0.0.0:2222/vole.git
A free and open-source forge that lives in your Git repo.
Bound what an unauthenticated SSH client can spend
78cd3437a597b0155682d2e8d5129bf7cdeac85d · Keenan Nemetz · 12d ago · parent b1499c72
Bound what an unauthenticated SSH client can spend
The SSH listener accepted every connection, gave each one a goroutine, and
started a process per session channel. A client that opened a socket and
never finished the handshake held all three for as long as it liked, and a
client that opened channels held a goroutine each. The host key was
hardened by `vole serve` on the way in, but the SSH package on its own
would happily load a key the whole machine could read.
Four bounds, all enforced before the expensive thing happens:
- A handshake deadline, cleared once the handshake completes so a clone
or a push is not cut. `ssh_handshake_timeout_seconds`, default 20.
- `ssh_max_connections` (default 64) tokens, one per open connection. Past
the cap the connection is closed before the handshake, the goroutine or
the process, and the accept loop keeps running so the listener cannot be
wedged. The "listener is full" warning is throttled to once per 10s so a
flood cannot become a disk problem instead.
- Eight session channels per connection, rejected at the channel layer
rather than by spawning a goroutine per request.
- `ssh_max_git_processes` (default 16) across every connection, covering
upload-pack, receive-pack and vole-change-merge. A command waits up to
30s for a slot and is then told to retry, rather than parked forever.
Payloads are bounded too: an exec line over 4 KiB is refused before it is
parsed, and a vole-runner request line over 1 MiB ends the session with an
error. The runner bound is a per-line reader, so json.Decoder's buffering
cannot hide an oversized request and a long-lived runner is not limited in
total.
Loading an existing host key now tightens it to 0600 and warns, and a mode
that cannot be tightened fails startup, so the package is safe on its own
rather than only behind `vole serve`.
Tests hold a connection without handshaking (it is dropped and its slot
returns), flood one connection with channels (the ninth is rejected and
closing one releases a slot), send an oversized exec line and an oversized
runner request (both refused), saturate the process pool (a bounded wait,
then a refusal), and load a 0644 host key (tightened).
docs/operations.md +14−4
| @@ -188,10 +188,20 @@ the linked sections explain each in full. | |||
| 188 | 188 | The same goes for `open_registration`, which is off by default. | |
| 189 | 189 | - **Conservative limits.** The defaults are chosen for a small instance: | |
| 190 | 190 | `git_http_max_concurrent = 16`, `git_http_max_per_client = 8`, | |
| 191 | `max_blob_bytes = 100 MiB`, `receive_max_bytes = 1 GiB`, and a 600 s budget for | ||
| 192 | one clone. Raise them with measurements, not with optimism; the read path is | ||
| 193 | anonymous, so a limit that is too low is a slow clone and a limit that is | ||
| 194 | missing is an outage. | ||
| 191 | `ssh_max_connections = 64`, `ssh_max_git_processes = 16`, | ||
| 192 | `ssh_handshake_timeout_seconds = 20`, `max_blob_bytes = 100 MiB`, | ||
| 193 | `receive_max_bytes = 1 GiB`, and a 600 s budget for one clone. Raise them with | ||
| 194 | measurements, not with optimism; the read path is anonymous, so a limit that is | ||
| 195 | too low is a slow clone and a limit that is missing is an outage. | ||
| 196 | - **Bounded before authentication.** The SSH listener refuses connections past | ||
| 197 | `ssh_max_connections` before the handshake and drops a connection that has not | ||
| 198 | finished its handshake in `ssh_handshake_timeout_seconds`, so an anonymous | ||
| 199 | client cannot hold a file descriptor by opening a socket and saying nothing. | ||
| 200 | After the handshake one connection may hold eight session channels, and the | ||
| 201 | git commands they run share `ssh_max_git_processes`; an exec line longer than | ||
| 202 | 4 KiB and a runner request line longer than 1 MiB are refused. Address-based | ||
| 203 | backoff for repeated bad keys is a quota concern, not a transport bound, so it | ||
| 204 | belongs with the abuse controls rather than here. | ||
| 195 | 205 | - **Audited administration.** Remote administration uses the same SSH listener | |
| 196 | 206 | and is restricted to instance admins. Ship the audit log off the host: local | |
| 197 | 207 | append-only is not tamper-evident. See [Audit log](#audit-log) and | |