vole
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Phase 4: the runner publishes its result as a signed commit
90fdaf397a1120677a1246201369e6dcc82b0aed · Keenan Nemetz · 17d ago · parent 96cbb6fa
Phase 4: the runner publishes its result as a signed commit A finished run's result existed only in data/runs.db and the object store, so a clone carried the commits and the workflow but not the fact that CI passed, who said so, or the log it said it with. And the previous cut of this change had the server commit the record — which is the box vouching for a party, the same mistake as the instance signing key that was deleted. The runner now publishes it. When an attempt ends the runner commits runs/<run id>/<attempt>/ — record.md (repo, ref, sha, workflow blob, job, steps digest, exit, finish time, signer, key) plus an LFS pointer for the log and one per artifact — together with any release pointers the build published, and pushes that once. One push per run: the result and the artifacts it produced are one fact, so a release cannot carry bytes whose build has no record. The commit is signed with the runner's SSH key, and that signature is the whole attestation: it covers the tree, the parents and the message, so the separate claim and signature file are gone, and there is no second statement to keep in step with the files it describes. pre-receive checks it against an allowed-signers file built from the pushing account's keys, so identity comes from the key and not from a name typed into a commit. Who may report is the repository's runner allowlist — the same list that decides who may lease a job — and the record must describe the job the queue handed that account: same run, same attempt, same commit, workflow, job and steps digest. Without that an allowed runner could report a green result for a commit nobody asked it to build, or invent attempt 99 and have the next rebuild believe it. Records are append-only, with no admin override: an edit or a deletion is a rewrite of evidence, and the alternative to refusing is running the job again. runs.db keeps the queue (queued and leased jobs have no record because they have not happened) and mirrors finished runs as derived rows, which vole index rebuild reconstructs from the branch. The attestation row now names the commit instead of storing a claim and a signature. Measured: a real run finished, a bare clone carried runs/<id>/1/record.md, git verify-commit accepted that commit under the roster and refused an unsigned one; a writer who is not a runner was refused by pre-receive naming the allowlist; one CI release commit carried both the record and releases/v1.0.0/tool-linux; deleting runs.db and rebuilding restored the row, the attestation and the log.
internal/hook/hook.go +8
| @@ -262,6 +262,14 @@ func PreReceive(cfg Config) int { | |||
| 262 | 262 | } | |
| 263 | 263 | // The issues branch is user-authored content, so it is validated at the | |
| 264 | 264 | // boundary: bad data never reaches the tree the web reads. | |
| 265 | // | ||
| 266 | // Run records share the branch but not the authorship: they are written by | ||
| 267 | // the runner that ran the job, and the gate's question about them is who was | ||
| 268 | // allowed to. See records.go. | ||
| 269 | if c.ref == issues.Ref { | ||
| 270 | problems = append(problems, recordFindings(g, c, a, actor, actorID, | ||
| 271 | m.Name, cfg.UsersDB, cfg.RunsDB, who)...) | ||
| 272 | } | ||
| 265 | 273 | if c.ref == issues.Ref && c.new != gitx.ZeroSHA { | |
| 266 | 274 | for _, prob := range issues.Validate(g, c.new) { | |
| 267 | 275 | problems = append(problems, "issues: "+prob) | |