vole
Clone
Read only, no credentials:
https://rodent.software/git/vole.git
Write over SSH with a registered key:
git clone ssh://git@0.0.0.0:2222/vole.git
A free and open-source forge that lives in your Git repo.
Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository
31df8baea9c9e8acf74b71bdda26d27907b30f2a · Keenan Nemetz · 17d ago · parent 36293228
Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository
Names were the primary key everywhere — the keys file name, the ACL entry, the
approval file — so renaming someone broke their access, orphaned their approvals,
and left a retired name able to hand a newcomer the old holder's rights. This
splits identity into an account (stable id, anchored by its SSH keys) and a name
(mutable, never reissued).
data/system.git refs/heads/main
users/<ulid>/meta.json name, status, keys, former_names
Everything that grants authority now holds the id: ACL entries, approval files,
and the identity resolved at the SSH handshake (VOLE_ACTOR_ID). A rename is a
one-file change that disturbs nothing else, and both the old and new names stay
reserved forever.
The roster moved from a trusted-keys directory back into git, which reverses an
earlier simplification — deliberately, and in a smaller shape (one file per
account, one writer, no CAS plumbing for unused fields). Git buys what a directory
could not: `git log` answers who renamed whom and when a key appeared, and the
roster is now readable by anyone who can clone, since it is served read-only at
ssh://host/system.git. `vole request new` and `approve` use exactly that to turn a
name typed on the command line into the account id they store.
Two latent bugs surfaced, both caught by tests added here:
- gitx inherited git's repository-scoped environment. pre-receive runs with
GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY and GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH pointing at the pushed repository's
quarantine, so every git call a hook made for a *different* repository silently
read the pushed one: the hook saw an empty roster. gitx now scrubs those
variables and the hook restores them for the pushed repository only.
- The hook built the repository name with filepath.Base on receive-pack's path,
which carries a trailing separator, so refusals read "does not have write access
to .". Cleaned first.
Verified end to end on a live instance: two accounts file, approve and land a
change; `vole user rename wilbur robert` keeps the same key's write access and the
approval still reads as current, now credited to robert; the roster history shows
"user: rename wilbur to robert"; retiring an account rejects its key within five
seconds and refuses to reissue the name.
docs/roadmap.md +18
| @@ -221,6 +221,21 @@ prior approval, an approval for `main` cannot be repointed at another branch, a | |||
| 221 | 221 | self-approval or impersonated approval is refused, an admin bypass works, and each merge | |
| 222 | 222 | is written to the audit log with the request id and approvers. | |
| 223 | 223 | ||
| 224 | ### Phase 3.5 — the system repository | ||
| 225 | |||
| 226 | ✅ **Done.** `data/system.git` is the instance repository. Its `main` branch holds | ||
| 227 | the user roster (`users/<ulid>/meta.json`: name, status, keys, former names). | ||
| 228 | |||
| 229 | - Accounts have a stable id; names are mutable, and a name is never issued twice, so | ||
| 230 | a new account cannot inherit a retired one's ACL entries or approvals. | ||
| 231 | - ACL entries and approval files are keyed by account id, so `vole user rename` is a | ||
| 232 | one-file change that disturbs nothing else. | ||
| 233 | - The roster is polled every five seconds, so `add-key` and `retire` take effect | ||
| 234 | without a restart. | ||
| 235 | - Planned, not built: the instance landing page served from the same repository | ||
| 236 | (`pages/` on `main`), and exposing the roster read-only over SSH/web so a reader | ||
| 237 | can verify it without server access. | ||
| 238 | |||
| 224 | 239 | ### Phase 4 — CI/CD | |
| 225 | 240 | ||
| 226 | 241 | - `.vole/workflows/*.yaml` parsed and validated at push time; invalid workflows fail loudly | |
| @@ -361,6 +376,9 @@ Filled in as phases land. Append; don't rewrite. | |||
| 361 | 376 | | 2026-10-22 | Approvals name a commit and a branch; the merge is a push | A branch-moving head makes "approve once" meaningless, and a push needs no new write surface | | |
| 362 | 377 | | 2026-10-22 | Only the named principal may write their own approval file | A filename is not authentication; the hook compares it to the SSH identity resolved at handshake | | |
| 363 | 378 | | 2026-10-22 | Approval ownership checks cover modify/rename, not just add | A file that already exists can be edited to name a different commit; `--diff-filter=A` alone is bypassable | | |
| 379 | | 2026-10-22 | Accounts have a stable id; names are mutable and never reissued | A name is not an identity: renaming broke ACLs and orphaned approvals, and reusing a name would hand over someone's access | | ||
| 380 | | 2026-10-22 | The roster lives in `data/system.git` on `refs/heads/main` | One authoritative copy, portable and auditable with plain git; per-repository copies would make revocation non-atomic | | ||
| 381 | | 2026-10-22 | `gitx` scrubs git's repository-scoped environment | pre-receive sets `GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY`/quarantine for the pushed repo, which silently redirected a hook's git calls for other repositories | | ||
| 364 | 382 | | 2026-10-22 | CLI accepts options after arguments, as git does | Refusing them is a local dialect; `git commit -m x path` is the shape people type | | |
| 365 | 383 | ||
| 366 | 384 | ## Open questions | |