vole

Clone

Read only, no credentials:

https://rodent.software/git/vole.git

Write over SSH with a registered key:

git clone ssh://git@0.0.0.0:2222/vole.git

A free and open-source forge that lives in your Git repo.

Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository

31df8baea9c9e8acf74b71bdda26d27907b30f2a · Keenan Nemetz · 17d ago · parent 36293228

Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository

Names were the primary key everywhere — the keys file name, the ACL entry, the
approval file — so renaming someone broke their access, orphaned their approvals,
and left a retired name able to hand a newcomer the old holder's rights. This
splits identity into an account (stable id, anchored by its SSH keys) and a name
(mutable, never reissued).

  data/system.git  refs/heads/main
    users/<ulid>/meta.json   name, status, keys, former_names

Everything that grants authority now holds the id: ACL entries, approval files,
and the identity resolved at the SSH handshake (VOLE_ACTOR_ID). A rename is a
one-file change that disturbs nothing else, and both the old and new names stay
reserved forever.

The roster moved from a trusted-keys directory back into git, which reverses an
earlier simplification — deliberately, and in a smaller shape (one file per
account, one writer, no CAS plumbing for unused fields). Git buys what a directory
could not: `git log` answers who renamed whom and when a key appeared, and the
roster is now readable by anyone who can clone, since it is served read-only at
ssh://host/system.git. `vole request new` and `approve` use exactly that to turn a
name typed on the command line into the account id they store.

Two latent bugs surfaced, both caught by tests added here:

- gitx inherited git's repository-scoped environment. pre-receive runs with
  GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY and GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH pointing at the pushed repository's
  quarantine, so every git call a hook made for a *different* repository silently
  read the pushed one: the hook saw an empty roster. gitx now scrubs those
  variables and the hook restores them for the pushed repository only.
- The hook built the repository name with filepath.Base on receive-pack's path,
  which carries a trailing separator, so refusals read "does not have write access
  to .". Cleaned first.

Verified end to end on a live instance: two accounts file, approve and land a
change; `vole user rename wilbur robert` keeps the same key's write access and the
approval still reads as current, now credited to robert; the roster history shows
"user: rename wilbur to robert"; retiring an account rejects its key within five
seconds and refuses to reissue the name.

internal/sshserver/sshserver_test.go +8−3

@@ -72,21 +72,26 @@ func newHarness(t testing.T) harness {
	72	72	writer, writerPub := keypair(t, filepath.Join(dir, "writer"))
	73	73	reader, readerPub := keypair(t, filepath.Join(dir, "reader"))
	74	74
		75	var writerID string
	75	76	for _, u := range []struct{ name, pub string }{
	76	77	{"writer", writerPub},
	77	78	{"reader", readerPub},
	78	79	} {
	79		if err := ident.Create(u.name); err != nil {
		80	acct, err := ident.Create(u.name, "test")
		81	if err != nil {
	80	82	t.Fatal(err)
	81	83	}
	82		if _, err := ident.AddKey(u.name, u.pub, "test"); err != nil {
		84	if _, err := ident.AddKey(acct.ID, u.pub, "test"); err != nil {
	83	85	t.Fatal(err)
	84	86	}
		87	if u.name == "writer" {
		88	writerID = acct.ID
		89	}
	85	90	}
	86	91
	87	92	rs := repo.New(filepath.Join(dir, "repos"), binPath)
	88	93	rs.MaxInputBytes = 1 << 20
	89		m, err := rs.Create("demo", "writer", "")
		94	m, err := rs.Create("demo", writerID, "")
	90	95	if err != nil {
	91	96	t.Fatal(err)
	92	97	}