vole
Clone
Read only, no credentials:
https://rodent.software/vole.git
Write over SSH with a registered key:
git clone ssh://git@rodent.software:2222/vole.git
A free and open-source forge that lives in your Git repo.
Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository
31df8baea9c9e8acf74b71bdda26d27907b30f2a · Keenan Nemetz · 18d ago · parent 36293228
Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository
Names were the primary key everywhere — the keys file name, the ACL entry, the
approval file — so renaming someone broke their access, orphaned their approvals,
and left a retired name able to hand a newcomer the old holder's rights. This
splits identity into an account (stable id, anchored by its SSH keys) and a name
(mutable, never reissued).
data/system.git refs/heads/main
users/<ulid>/meta.json name, status, keys, former_names
Everything that grants authority now holds the id: ACL entries, approval files,
and the identity resolved at the SSH handshake (VOLE_ACTOR_ID). A rename is a
one-file change that disturbs nothing else, and both the old and new names stay
reserved forever.
The roster moved from a trusted-keys directory back into git, which reverses an
earlier simplification — deliberately, and in a smaller shape (one file per
account, one writer, no CAS plumbing for unused fields). Git buys what a directory
could not: `git log` answers who renamed whom and when a key appeared, and the
roster is now readable by anyone who can clone, since it is served read-only at
ssh://host/system.git. `vole request new` and `approve` use exactly that to turn a
name typed on the command line into the account id they store.
Two latent bugs surfaced, both caught by tests added here:
- gitx inherited git's repository-scoped environment. pre-receive runs with
GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY and GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH pointing at the pushed repository's
quarantine, so every git call a hook made for a *different* repository silently
read the pushed one: the hook saw an empty roster. gitx now scrubs those
variables and the hook restores them for the pushed repository only.
- The hook built the repository name with filepath.Base on receive-pack's path,
which carries a trailing separator, so refusals read "does not have write access
to .". Cleaned first.
Verified end to end on a live instance: two accounts file, approve and land a
change; `vole user rename wilbur robert` keeps the same key's write access and the
approval still reads as current, now credited to robert; the roster history shows
"user: rename wilbur to robert"; retiring an account rejects its key within five
seconds and refuses to reissue the name.
internal/config/config.go +4−3
| @@ -53,10 +53,11 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) { | |||
| 53 | 53 | ||
| 54 | 54 | func (c *Config) ReposDir() string { return filepath.Join(c.DataDir, "repos") } | |
| 55 | 55 | ||
| 56 | // TrustedKeysDir holds the user roster: one <user>.keys file per user. | ||
| 57 | func (c *Config) TrustedKeysDir() string { return filepath.Join(c.DataDir, "trusted_keys") } | ||
| 56 | // SystemRepo is the instance repository: the user roster lives on its main | ||
| 57 | // branch, and later the instance's landing page will live there too. | ||
| 58 | func (c *Config) SystemRepo() string { return filepath.Join(c.DataDir, "system.git") } | ||
| 58 | 59 | ||
| 59 | // AuditLog records roster changes, replacing what git history used to provide. | ||
| 60 | // AuditLog records privileged operations. Roster history also lives in git. | ||
| 60 | 61 | func (c *Config) AuditLog() string { return filepath.Join(c.DataDir, "audit.log") } | |
| 61 | 62 | func (c *Config) IndexDB() string { return filepath.Join(c.DataDir, "index.db") } | |
| 62 | 63 | func (c *Config) InstanceKey() string { return filepath.Join(c.DataDir, "instance.key") } | |