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Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository
31df8baea9c9e8acf74b71bdda26d27907b30f2a · Keenan Nemetz · 18d ago · parent 36293228
Accounts with stable ids; the roster moves into the system repository
Names were the primary key everywhere — the keys file name, the ACL entry, the
approval file — so renaming someone broke their access, orphaned their approvals,
and left a retired name able to hand a newcomer the old holder's rights. This
splits identity into an account (stable id, anchored by its SSH keys) and a name
(mutable, never reissued).
data/system.git refs/heads/main
users/<ulid>/meta.json name, status, keys, former_names
Everything that grants authority now holds the id: ACL entries, approval files,
and the identity resolved at the SSH handshake (VOLE_ACTOR_ID). A rename is a
one-file change that disturbs nothing else, and both the old and new names stay
reserved forever.
The roster moved from a trusted-keys directory back into git, which reverses an
earlier simplification — deliberately, and in a smaller shape (one file per
account, one writer, no CAS plumbing for unused fields). Git buys what a directory
could not: `git log` answers who renamed whom and when a key appeared, and the
roster is now readable by anyone who can clone, since it is served read-only at
ssh://host/system.git. `vole request new` and `approve` use exactly that to turn a
name typed on the command line into the account id they store.
Two latent bugs surfaced, both caught by tests added here:
- gitx inherited git's repository-scoped environment. pre-receive runs with
GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY and GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH pointing at the pushed repository's
quarantine, so every git call a hook made for a *different* repository silently
read the pushed one: the hook saw an empty roster. gitx now scrubs those
variables and the hook restores them for the pushed repository only.
- The hook built the repository name with filepath.Base on receive-pack's path,
which carries a trailing separator, so refusals read "does not have write access
to .". Cleaned first.
Verified end to end on a live instance: two accounts file, approve and land a
change; `vole user rename wilbur robert` keeps the same key's write access and the
approval still reads as current, now credited to robert; the roster history shows
"user: rename wilbur to robert"; retiring an account rejects its key within five
seconds and refuses to reissue the name.
internal/hook/names_test.go +27
| @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ | |||
| 1 | package hook | ||
| 2 | |||
| 3 | import ( | ||
| 4 | "path/filepath" | ||
| 5 | "testing" | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | "github.com/rodent-software/vole/internal/identity" | ||
| 8 | ) | ||
| 9 | |||
| 10 | func TestOpenNamesResolves(t *testing.T) { | ||
| 11 | dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "system.git") | ||
| 12 | if err := identity.Init(dir); err != nil { | ||
| 13 | t.Fatal(err) | ||
| 14 | } | ||
| 15 | s, err := identity.Open(dir) | ||
| 16 | if err != nil { | ||
| 17 | t.Fatal(err) | ||
| 18 | } | ||
| 19 | a, err := s.Create("keenan", "test") | ||
| 20 | if err != nil { | ||
| 21 | t.Fatal(err) | ||
| 22 | } | ||
| 23 | got := openNames(dir)(a.ID) | ||
| 24 | if got != "keenan" { | ||
| 25 | t.Fatalf("openNames = %q, want keenan (id %s)", got, a.ID) | ||
| 26 | } | ||
| 27 | } | ||